Characteristics and Future Trends of Sino-French Relations中法关系特点及未来走向

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. Looking back on these sixty years, two points are at the core. First, France is the first major Western country to establish ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with China. Second, bilateral relations have experienced ups and downs over the past sixty years.

From the perspective of international relations, these two points are actually the same thing: national strategic interests determine the development and direction of bilateral relations.

Characteristics of Sino-French relations

When China and France established diplomatic relations in 1964, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was in full swing. In terms of political systems, China and France belong to two different camps, with completely opposite values. There is no economic cooperation between the two parties and no common economic interests. Geopolitically, the two sides are far apart, neither a threat nor a need for concern. In particular, France faced strong opposition from the United States, and China had not yet obtained United Nations membership at the time. But it was in this context that the two sides jointly launched a diplomatic nuclear bomb that shocked the world: the establishment of diplomatic relations.

In fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations, as the starting point of bilateral relations, has revealed the essence of Sino-French relations: Although China and France are both important powers in the world, there is no strategic need between the two sides. The factor that determines the relationship between the two sides is the major national strategic interests brought by external third parties. The establishment of diplomatic relations, conflicts, and re-cooperation during these sixty years were all determined by this factor, and changed with the disappearance and appearance of this factor.

From the perspective of international relations theory, the relationship between countries depends on two factors: first, whether the two sides have security conflicts and whether they have major strategic interest opposition. If there were, it would not be a strategic partnership. For example, after the unification of Germany in the 18th century, it has always threatened France’s national security. The two sides remained in strategic confrontation for more than 70 years until the end of World War II.

The second is whether the two sides have common major strategic interests. Otherwise, they may not become important allies even if there is no conflict. This is the case in France and Japan, for example. In 1973,French President Pompidou visited China, which was an economically weak country. However, in April 1982, President Mitterrand made his first visit to Japan, which had long been a developed country. Because visiting China can show that France is an independent power in the world and highlight its status as a major power, visiting Japan can only have economic significance.

Sino-French relations are also subject to these two conditions. The first condition is stable, but the second condition is changing and is also the real variable affecting Sino-French relations.

After World War II, France’s highest national interest was to restore its status as a great power that had been lost due to its rapid defeat. At that time, it was the United States, the Western alliance leader, that influenced France’s independence. Because if the United States wants to win the Cold War, it must command the entire West. General de Gaulle criticized the diplomacy of the Fourth Republic: it submitted France to Anglo-Saxon hegemony on the pretext of achieving Atlantic unity. However, with France’s national power declining, de Gaulle could only rely on the external environment if he wanted to challenge US hegemony. That is to use its special position in the confrontation between East and West to achieve its goals. The specific approach was to play both the Soviet card and the Chinese card. The China card is the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides.

From China’s perspective, restoring its status as a global power lost since 1840 and realizing national rejuvenation are the most important national interests.

However, after World War II, both France and New China were in ruins. For this reason, China turned to the Soviet Union, while France relied on the United States for both economy and security. However, China and France are both countries with a long tradition of great powers and cannot be dependent on other countries for a long time. Getting rid of this external dependence is an inevitable choice. This is why China and France quickly said no to the Soviet Union and the United States.

However, in a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, even gaining true independence is not enough to ensure great power status. It also requires the ability to resist the pressure of the two superpowers. One of the keys to this is finding strong enough allies. Naturally, China and France have turned their attention to each other. In this way, China and France jointly created the third pole besides the United States and the Soviet Union, and maximized their own strategic interests:not only achieving true independence, they also effectively resolved the costs of getting rid of the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the same time significantly improved their status in the world. China and France are two countries that are far apart and do not have any common strategic interests. However, in order to cope with the bipolar world of the United States and the Soviet Union, they have formed a de facto strategic alliance.

In short, in the context of the bipolar world between the United States and the Soviet Union, with China and France as the intermediate force, the common strategic interest of both sides is to support each other in seeking to become an independent major power. The reason that prompted the two sides to overcome huge difficulties and establish diplomatic relations was not China and France themselves, but external factors.

In contrast, in 1988, US President Ronald Reagan announced the end of the Cold War, and in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. After the end of the Cold War, both China and France were severely affected, especially as a result of China and France losing their strategic needs for each other.

For France, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and its strategic relationship with China has lost its meaning. France lost two major forces at once. In addition, Germany has also achieved reunification. A powerful Germany objectively has the ability to replace France in Europe. Later, there was the double eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. On the one hand, the power of the United States has become stronger. On the other hand, the accession of Central and Eastern European countries has increasingly weakened France’s position and role in the EU, and the EU’s power structure has undergone tremendous changes.

China has lost the basis for establishing alliances with the West.

So during this period, although the first condition still exists,but since the two sides no longer share common strategic interests, their relationship has become dispensable, even though their status as world powers has not changed. Therefore, under this background, the first major conflict in the relationship between the two parties occurred. The representative incident was France’s arms sales to Taiwan in 1992.

The special relationship between France and the United States in the 21st century is the most important variable between China and France

In the 21st century, China-France relations have ushered in a new period of strategic opportunities. Although the competition between China and the United States has replaced the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in the past, what remains unchanged is that France is still the country in the Western camp that has the best and most strategic relations with China. Today, the strategic needs of both parties are broader. France has four major needs for China: strategic autonomy, an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, global governance such as climate protection, and the rise of American populism, especially the challenges posed by the Trumpization of the Republican Party. Faced with comprehensive containment by the United States, China certainly also needs France, an important country in the EU. However, broader strategic needs have not changed the nature of Sino-French relations: it is still determined by third-party factors, and it is still closely related to the United States. But what is more complicated than the Cold War is that China is on the front line of the strategic game with the United States, and France has little room to choose sides and take advantage of it. During this period, the particularity of France-US relations has become the most important factor affecting Sino-France relations.

The special relationship between France and the United States is mainly reflected in the fact that both sides have conflicts of interest at the strategic level, but they both deliberately maintain the appearance of strategic allies.

From the perspective of national strategic interests, France and the United States have major conflicts.

For the United States, it needs to unify the West to cope with the rise of China, and for this it must firmly control France. If France wants to maintain its great power status and strategic autonomy, it must get rid of the control of the United States. The national strategic interests of both sides are completely opposite.

From a longer-term perspective, Europe is also a potential challenger to America’s hegemony. The EU’s economic strength, technological level, military strength and the degree of internationalization of the euro are actually the closest to those of the United States. Therefore, the United States must prevent the EU from deepening its integration and strategic autonomy. This is contrary to France’s strategic interests.

Therefore, it is no surprise that in the current game between China and the United States, it is France that openly opposes the United States: it emphasizes that it will not decouple from China, that Taiwan is not a European problem, and that it opposes the expansion of NATO to Asia.

On the other hand, the United States is also preventing and suppressing France. For example, not only did France not be allowed to join organizations such as AUKUS, but it also used the Russia-Ukraine conflict to abolish France’s Russia card, which greatly undermined France’s strategic autonomy.

At the same time, a series of bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act were also enacted to harm the reindustrialization of France and Europe. As for taking away submarine orders from France and Australia, the goal is to destroy the military research and development capabilities that maintain France’s status as an independent power.

But no matter how the two sides fight, France and the United States still have to show their alliance in public. This is what makes the Franco-American relationship special. There are two main explanations in French academic circles: First, historical sentiments. The second is shared values.

The so-called historical feelings refer to several life-and-death cooperations between France and the United States: France sent an expeditionary force to support the American War of Independence, the United States helped Europe defeat Germany in World War I, and liberated France in World War II. Not to mention that both France and America are for their own benefit,more importantly, the United States and Russia also have historical feelings: Russia refused the British King’s request to send troops to suppress the American Revolution. It was the only European country to support the Lincoln government during the Civil War, and was also an ally in World War I and World War II. But what is the current relationship between the United States and Russia?

The so-called shared values are even more untenable. When France sent the expeditionary force, its values were completely different from those of the United States. In World War I and World War II, the two sides did not divide their enemies and friends based on their values. According to Western standards, Russia’s most democratic and pro-Western period was the Yeltsin era, but NATO’s eastward expansion began when he was in power.

What does the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France have to do with the values of both sides? The same goes for the improvement of relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

Fundamentally, it’s still profit. France has multiple national interests related to the United States.

One is strategic interests. There are many factors that support France’s status as a major power in the world. For example, permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, comprehensive national strength, French-speaking Africa, etc. But the reason why France was able to conduct balanced diplomacy in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and in today’s bipolar world between China and the United States is closely related to its identity as a Western country. In other words, the reason why the Soviet Union and China valued France was because it was an important member of Western countries. Its stance can not only have an impact on the entire West, but can also become a breakthrough for China and the Soviet Union to break the unified front of the West. For example, soon after China and France established diplomatic relations, six countries established diplomatic relations with China, and more countries made breakthroughs. Even within the United States, there were voices reflecting on relations with China.But if France really breaks away from the Western camp led by the United States, it will only be a medium-sized country.In other words, France can only be attractive and offer the highest price to other forces only if it is based in the Western camp dominated by the United States. In terms of strength principles, this is France’s fundamentals.

The second is regular major interests.

After World War II, the United States has been the most powerful and developed country in the world. If France breaks with the United States, it will not only suffer retaliation, but will also lose the qualification to share various American resources. France is still very sober on this point. What’s more, its so-called balanced diplomacy aims to benefit all parties and is not dependent on any one . On the contrary, it must make all parties need it.

For example, in the Nixon era, France’s balanced diplomacy achieved the greatest results:Not only did the Soviet Union, China and France establish special relations, but the United States also recognized France’s “rebellion.” This is particularly reflected in nuclear assistance.

Atomic Energy ActAlthough the Atomic Energy Act at that time prohibited the United States and France from sharing nuclear technology, the United States invented a method of “negative guidance” to bypass the law:That is, French scientists explain their ideas and practices to the US side, and the US side points out whether they are right or wrong.Later, the United States provided assistance in the fields of miniaturization of nuclear bombs, prevention of nuclear test radiation, underground nuclear testing, navigation and power systems, and multi-warhead guidance technology, which directly accelerated the development of French nuclear forces.

From the perspective of the United States, whether it is the Cold War or today’s Sino-US game, it cannot afford to lose France.For example, the United States is now prominently playing the values card against China. If France completely sides with China, this card will be completely meaningless.In addition, France is a core country in Europe and has a huge influence in Europe. The United States’ allies are mainly in Europe. Without France, how effective will the power of Europe be?

Economically, the United States has always been France’s largest investor, with a cumulative total of US$106 billion in 2021.France attracted 1,815 foreign investment projects in 2023, with the United States ranking first with 305 projects. 4,600 American companies create 480,000 jobs in France.The United States is also France’s main investment destination. In 2021, French companies’ cumulative investment in the United States reached US$326 billion, and a total of 5,000 French companies have set up factories in the United States.France is also the second largest trading partner of the United States among EU countries and the ninth largest in the world. In 2022, the bilateral trade volume in goods and services exceeded US$150 billion and has maintained a long-term trade surplus.

France’s largest industry is tourism, which receives more than 80 million tourists every year, employs more than 2 million people, and accounts for 7.5% of GDP. It has always been regarded as a strategic industry by France.

Among them, American tourists have long ranked first among all countries, with as many as 2.4 million in 2022. In 2023, driven by American tourists, French tourism exceeded the level in 2019 before the epidemic.

France opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, triggering U.S. retaliation. As a result, French exports to the United States fell by 15%, and American tourists dropped by 80% in the first quarter of that year. French restaurants operating in the United States are deserted.

In short, the United States is not only the basis of France’s status as a global power, but also the only country that can damage France’s sovereignty and independence.

For this reason, under the conditions of the existence of the Soviet Union or China, on the one hand, France could constantly say no to the United States, but on the other hand, it could not break away from the Western camp.This is why after the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, France could only give up Russia, which has greater strategic value, and choose weak Ukraine.

It is precisely because of the characteristics of France that China and the United States sometimes have the same strategy towards France: both are based on subtraction rather than addition.

The so-called addition refers to attracting France to cooperate with itself, and the subtraction refers to preventing France from cooperating with the other party. The United States mainly undermined the China-EU investment agreement, and also tried to get France and Europe to actively decouple from China by hyping up “Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s . This is why France has not been able to participate in the three major systems used by the United States to contain China: AUKUS, QUAD, and the Five Eyes alliance.

China is based on preventing France from completely following the United States’ China policy, and it also does not require France to stand on China’s side. For example, France opposes the establishment of a NATO office in Japan.

Generally speaking, the structural factors of Franco-American relations will not change as long as the United States remains the global hegemon.France needs to not only stay in the Western camp led by the United States, but also say no to the United States based on the strength of its opponents, so as to seek the greatest national interests.This special relationship will change as the United States is surpassed or as its adversaries disappear.

Of course, this is not all that affects Sino-French relations. Two other points are equally important. First, the Sino-US game is far away from Europe. Europe can relatively maintain a distance and a certain degree of neutrality.

This is different from the Cold War when Europe was the main battlefield. This status allows France and Europe to benefit from both China and the United States. Second, the United States is trying to contain China for hegemony, not because China really threatens U.S. security. After World War II, France and Europe no longer pursue hegemony and do not consider China a threat.At present, They believe that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the real threat. Therefore, they try their best to avoid getting involved in the Sino-US conflict and avoid paying a huge price. France advocates that Europe should not choose sides, and there will be no camp confrontation.

It can be said that under various current historical conditions, the strategic game between China and the United States, the nature of the game, and the special relationship between France and the United States determine the direction and evolution of Sino-French relations. Among them, the special relationship between France and the United States is the main variable.

From China’s perspective, strategic structural needs between China and France will always exist until China surpasses the United States, or before a showdown between the two sides.France has also been able to play a role in blocking the United States in the Western camp, although it is for its own national interests and not for China. 

今年是中法建交六十周年。回顾这六十年，有两点是核心。第一，法国是第一个和中国建立大使级外交关系的西方大国；第二，六十年间双边关系起伏跌宕，风云变幻。
从国际关系角度，这两点其实是一点：国家战略利益决定了双边关系的发展和走向。

中法关系的特点

1964年中法建交时，美苏冷战正酣。从政治制度上，中法分属两个不同阵营，价值观上完全对立。经济上双方也没有任何合作，没有共同经济利益。地缘政治上，双方相隔遥远，既不是威胁，也没有必须正视和关注的需要。特别是法国还面临着美国的强烈反对，而且当时的新中国还没有获得联合国成员资格。但就是在这种背景下，双方共同放了一个震撼世界的外交核弹：建交。

事实上，建交作为双方关系的起点，就已经揭示了中法关系的本质。即：虽然中法都是世界上重要的大国，但双方本身之间并无战略性需求，没有压舱石，决定双方关系的因素是外部第三方带来的重大国家战略利益。这六十年的建交、冲突、再合作都是这一因素决定的，并随着这个因素的消失和出现而变动。

从学理上讲，国与国之间是什么关系就看两条：一是双方有没有安全冲突，有没有重大战略利益对立。如果有就不可能成为战略伙伴关系。比如德国十八世纪统一后，一直威胁到法国的国家安全，双方一直到二战结束前七十多年都是战略对抗。

二是双方有没有共同的重大战略利益，否则即使没有冲突也未必能成为重要的盟友。比如法国和日本就是如此。蓬皮杜1973年就访问当时经济弱小的中国，但1982年4月法国总统密特朗才第一次访问早已是发达国家的日本。因为访问中国能够体现法国是世界独立大国，彰显它的大国地位，访问日本则只能有经济意义。

中法关系也符合这两个条件的制约。第一个条件是恒定的，即双方相距遥远，不存在安全上的威胁。但第二个条件却是变动的，也是影响中法关系的真正变量。

二战之后，对于法国来讲，恢复因迅速战败而丧失的大国地位是最高国家利益。当时影响法国独立的正是西方盟主美国——美国要赢得冷战就要号令整个西方。戴高乐批评第四共和的外交“借口达到大西洋的团结，使法兰西屈服于盎格鲁撒克逊人的霸权之下”。但戴高乐要挑战美国霸权，以法国相对下降的国力而言，就只能借助外部环境：即利用自己在东西方对抗中的特殊地位来达到目的，具

体做法则是既打苏联牌，也打中国牌。打中国牌就是建交。

从中国的角度讲，恢复1840年以来丧失的全球大国地位，实现民族复兴是最重要的国家利益。

然而二战后的法国和新中国都是百废待兴，为此中国对苏联“一边倒”，法国则在经济和安全上都依靠美国。但中法都是有着悠久大国传统的国家，不可能长期依附他国。摆脱这种外部依赖是必然选择。这就是中法很快就分别对苏美说不的原因。

然而在美苏两极称霸的世界中，即使获得真正独立也并不足以确保大国地位，还要有能力对抗两个超级大国的制衡，这其中的关键之一就是要寻求够份量的盟友。很自然的，中法都把目光投向了对方。就这样中法联手打造了美苏之外的第三极，实现了本国战略利益的最大化：不仅实现了真正的独立自主，还有效对冲各自摆脱美苏的成本，同时大幅提升在世界上的地位。中法相隔遥远、本没有任何共同战略利益的两个国家就由于对冲美苏两极而结成了事实上的战略盟友的关系。

总之，在美苏两极世界的背景下，中法做为中间力量，双方共同的战略利益就是互相支持对方谋取独立自主的大国地位。促使双方克服巨大困难建交的原因并不在中法自身，而是外部因素。
可资对比的是，1988年美国总统里根宣布冷战结束，1991年苏联解体。冷战结束中法都受到严重冲击，特别是导致中法互相丧失对对方的战略需求。

对于法国而言，苏联不复存在，和中国的战略关系也失去了意义。法国一下失去两大力量。此外德国还实现了统一，一个强大的德国客观上具有在欧洲取代法国的能力。再到后来是北约和欧盟双东扩：一方面美国的力量更加强大，另一方面由于中东欧国家的加入，日益稀释了法国在欧盟的地位和作用，欧盟的权力结构发生了巨大的变化。

中国则失去了和西方建立盟友的基础。

所以在这一阶段，尽管第一个条件仍然存在，即中法互不存在安全问题，但由于双方不再有共同的战略利益，双方的关系变成了可有可无，即使双方都是世界大国的地位没有改变。于是在这个背景下出现了双方关系的第一次重大波动，代表性的事件就是法国1992年向台湾出售武器。

二十一世纪法美特殊关系是中法最重要变量

进入二十一世纪，中法关系迎来新的战略机遇期。虽然中美博弈取代过去的美苏冷战，但不变的是法国仍然是西方阵营中和中国关系最为良好也最具战略性的国家。到今天，双方的战略需求更加广泛。法国力推的战略自主需要中国，尽快结束俄乌冲突需要中国，全球治理如气候保护需要中国，美国民粹主义崛起特别是共和党特朗普化构成的挑战也需要中国。中国面对美国的全面遏制当然也需要欧盟核心国家法国。但更为广泛的战略需求并没有改变中法关系的本质：依旧是第三方因素决定，而且依然和美国密切相关。但比冷战时要复杂的是，中国处于和美国战略博弈的第一线，法国不选边和左右渔利的空间很小。在这个时期，法美关系的特殊性已经成为影响中法关系最重要的因素。

法美关系的特殊主要体现在双方存在着战略层面利益冲突，但又都刻意维持战略盟友的表象。

从国家战略利益角度看，法美存在重大冲突。

对于美国而言，它需要一统西方以应对中国的崛起，为此就必须牢牢控制住法国。法国要想维持大国地位和战略自主，就必须摆脱美国的控制。双方的国家战略利益可谓南辕北辙。

从更长远的角度，欧洲同样是美国霸主地位潜在的挑战者。欧盟的经济实力、科技水平、军事实力以及欧元的国际化程度实际上都是最接近美国的。为此，美国必须阻止欧盟的深度一体化和战略自主。这和法国的战略利益相背离。

所以毫不意外，在中美博弈的当下，公开和美国唱反调的是法国：强调不会和中国脱钩、台湾不是欧洲的问题、反对北约扩大到亚洲。

另一方面美国对法国的防范和打压也是一以贯之。比如不但没有让法国加入AUKUS等组织，还借助俄乌冲突废掉了法国的俄罗斯牌、极大的重挫了法国主导的战略自主。同时还制订《反通胀法案》等一系列法案损害法国和欧洲的再工业化。至于抢下法国和澳大利亚的潜艇订单，目标更直指维持法国独立大国地位的军事研发能力。

但不管双方如何明争暗斗，法美在公开场合仍然要显示双方的盟友关系。这就是法美关系的特殊之处。法国学界的解释主要有两点：一是历史感情。二是共同的价值观。

所谓历史感情，是指法美之间的几次生死之交：法国派出远征军支持美国独立战争、美国在一战时帮助欧洲打败德国、二战时解放了法国。且不说法美都是为了各自利益，更重要的是美俄也有历史感情：俄罗斯拒绝英国国王出兵镇压美国革命的请求、内战时是唯一一个支持林肯政府的欧洲国家，一战和二战也是盟友。但现在的美俄是一种什么关系？

所谓共同的价值观就更站不住脚。当初法国派远征军之时，价值观上和美国南辕北辙。一战和二战，对阵双方也不是按价值观划分敌友的。按西方的标准，俄罗斯最民主、最亲西方的时期是叶利钦时代，可是北约东扩就是在他主政时开始的。中法建交、中美改善关系和建交与双方的价值观又有什么关系？

归根到底，还是利益。美国对法国的国家利益也是多重的。

一是战略利益。支撑法国在世界上大国地位的因素很多。比如联合国常任理事国、综合国力、非洲法语区等。但法国之所以在美苏冷战和今天中美两极世界上能够进行平衡外交，和它的西方国家身份密切相关。或者说，苏联和中国之所以重视法国，就是因为它是西方国家重要的一员。它的立场不仅可以对整个西方产生影响，还能成为中苏打破西方统一阵线的突破口。比如中法建交当年就有六个国家和中国建交，更多国家则和中国关系取得突破，就是美国内部也出现对华关系反思的声音。但假如法国真的脱离美国主导的西方阵营，它也就只是中等份量的一极。也就是说只有立足美国为主的西方阵营，才能对其他力量有吸引力，也才能给其他力量开出最高价。从实力原则上讲，这是法国的基本盘。

二是常规重大收益。

二战后美国一直是世界上最强大和最发达的国家。如果法国和美国摊牌，不仅会受到报复，还失去分享美国各种资源的资格。这一点法国还是非常清醒。更何况它的所谓平衡外交是要各方获利，不依赖于某一方，相反还要使各方都需要它。

比如进入尼克松时代，法国的平衡外交取得最巨大成果：不仅苏联、中国和法国建立特殊关系，美国也认可了法国的“反骨”。这突出体现在核援助上。虽然当时《原子能法》禁止美国和法国分享核技术，但美国发明出“否定引导”的办法绕过了法律：即法国科学家向美方阐述他们的思路和做法，美方指出是正确还是错误。后来美国在核弹小型化、防止核试验辐射、地下核试验、导航和动力系统、多弹头分导技术等领域都进行了帮助，直接加速了法国核力量的发展。

从美国的角度，无论是冷战还是今天的中美博弈，它也承受不起失去法国的代价。比如现在美国对中国突出打价值观牌，如果法国完全站到中国一边，这张牌就完全失去意义。此外法国是欧洲核心国家，在欧洲影响巨大，美国的盟友力量主要体现在欧洲，没有了法国，欧洲这个力量还会有多大效用？

从经济角度看，美国一直是法国的第一大投资国，2021年累计达到1060亿美元。2023年法国吸引了1,815个国外投资项目，美国以305 个项目高居第一。4600家美国企业在法国创造了48万就业。美国也是法国的主要投资地，2021年法国企业在美国投资累计已达3260亿美元，共有5000家法国企业在美国设厂。法国还是欧盟国家中美国的第二大贸易伙伴、全球第九大，2022年双边货物和服务贸易额突破1500亿美元而且长期保持贸易顺差。

法国第一大产业是旅游业，每年接待游客8000万以上，有超过200万人就业，占GDP比重为7.5%，一向被法国视为战略产业。这其中美国游客长期高居各国之首，2022年高达240万。2023年更是由于美国游客的拉动，法国旅游业一举超过疫情前的2019年。

2003年法国反对美国入侵伊拉克，引发美国报复。导致法国对美出口下降15%，当年第一季度美国游客下降80%。在美国经营的法国餐馆也门可罗雀。

总之，美国既是法国全球大国地位的基本盘，也是唯一能损害法国主权和独立的国家。为此，在苏联或中国存在的前提下，一方面法国要不断对美国说不，另一方面却无法脱离西方阵营。这就是为什么俄乌冲突爆发后，法国只能放弃战略价值更大的俄罗斯而选择弱小的乌克兰。

也正是由于法国的特点，中美两国有时对法国的策略一致：都立足于做减法而不是做加法。

所谓做加法是指拉法国配合自己，做减法是指阻止法国和对方的合作。美国主要破坏了中欧投资协定，还通过炒作“今日乌克兰、明日台湾”意图让法国以及欧洲和中国主动脱钩。这也是为什么美国遏制中国的三大体系：AUKUS、四方安全对话机制和五眼联盟，法国都没能参加。

中国则是立足于让法国不完全跟随美国的对华政策，也同样不要求法国站在中国一边。比如法国反对北约在日本设立办事处就是一例。

总的来看，在美国仍然是全球霸主的情况下，法美关系的结构性因素就不会变化。法国既需要留在美国为首的西方阵营中，又立足于美国对手实力的基础上对美国说不，从而谋取最大的国家利益。这种特殊关系将随着美国被超越或者美国的对手消失而改变。

当然这并不是影响中法关系的全部。还有两点同样重要。一是中美博弈远离欧洲。欧洲相对可以保持距离，某种程度的中立。这和冷战时欧洲是主战场不同。这种地位可以让法国和欧洲同时从中美两强获利。

二是美国遏制中国是为了霸权，不是中国真的威胁到美国的安全。二战后的法国和欧洲已经不追求霸权，并不认为中国是威胁。目前更认为俄乌冲突才是真正的威胁。所以它尽量避免卷入中美冲突而付出巨大代价。法国倡导欧洲不选边，就不会形成阵营对抗。

可以说，在当下的各种历史条件下，中美战略博弈和性质、法美特殊关系决定了中法关系的走向和演变。这其中法美特殊关系是主要变量。

从中国的角度来看，在中国超越美国之前，或双方摊牌之前，中法之间战略性结构性需求就会一直存在。法国也一直能够发挥在西方阵营中阻挠美国的作用，尽管法国是出于自身国家利益需要而并非为了中国。