Trump’s Election is a New Opportunity for China-EU Relations特朗普当选是中欧关系的新机遇

Trump made a strong comeback and won the election with a clear advantage, shattering the predictions of previous major polls and shocking the world. If the 2016 election was an accident, this time there is no dispute. In fact, looking back, if it were not for the sudden epidemic, Trump would still be elected in 2020. The results of the three elections show that today’s United States has indeed fundamentally changed. It is no longer the so-called liberal hegemon that the world is accustomed to, but a country dominated by populism.

Although the United States is a declining hegemon, it still has a huge influence on the world. The presidential election is its domestic affair, but it has significant external implications. This also includes China-EU relations.

The structural relationship between China, the United States and Europe

At present, China, the United States and Europe have a relatively stable structural relationship based on their strength and interests.

From the perspective of the United States, China’s rapid development threatens its hegemony, so it regards China as its number one opponent and tries its best to contain it.Therefore, it not only shifts from the Atlantic – Europe to the Pacific – Asia, but also requires the full cooperation of European allies, and even requires Europe to sacrifice its interests.

For this reason, it has been trying to destroy Europe’s strategic independence ,and it has also forced Europe not to use China’s cheap and high-quality 5G technology, nor to sell highly profitable chip technology to China. It is best to fully decouple from China and pay the price for the Sino-US game.

In addition, the United States will also try its best to undermine the strategic cooperation between China and Europe. When Biden first took office in March 2021, he used the values card to induce Europe to impose sanctions on China, and China had to counter-sanctions. As a result, the strategically valuable investment agreement that took China and the EU seven years to negotiate was frozen, hurting both China and the EU.

At least judging from the results, when the United States implements its strategic goal of containing China, it also weakens and controls Europe that has the potential to challenge its hegemony.

From China’s perspective, facing US repression, Europe is also needed. China not only wants to prevent Europe from completely turning towards the United States, but also needs European markets and technologies to be open.

In addition, Europe is also the only country in the world that can have a significant influence on the United States. For example, after the China-U.S. Presidential Summit in San Francisco in 2023, Sino-U.S. relations began to stabilize. French media reported that it was the result of Europe exerting tremendous pressure on Biden.

But there are still contradictions and conflicts between China and Europe. In addition to differences in values and the destructive intervention of the United States, this is mainly due to the different strategic positioning of the two sides towards the other.

At a time when the United States is the main obstacle to China’s rejuvenation, China’s diplomacy with Europe serves its diplomacy with the United States. Europe, on the other hand, views China more with its own interests in mind. For example, strategic autonomy, climate change and other global issues closely related to its own interests, security issues caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and avoiding becoming a victim of the game between China and the United States.

Therefore, the recent dispute between China and Europe over electric vehicles and the differences between China and Europe on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are typical examples.

The electric vehicle tariff war has two characteristics. First, the tariffs imposed by Europe are far lower than those imposed by the United States. Second, China did not retaliate immediately. Instead, it filed a lawsuit at the WTO, which had to be resolved through the international legal system. At the same time, it conducted a large number of diplomatic negotiations in an attempt to change the EU’s policy. This is very different from China’s tariff war with the United States.

Because China views the electric vehicle tariffs between China and Europe from the perspective of the game against the United States. China must not only actively defend its own economic interests, but also pay attention to the overall strategic situation of the Sino-US gameEurope is very clear about this and knows that China will not abandon Europe because of electric vehicle tariffs. This is also the reason why China and Europe will have trade frictions but will not decouple or break links and still maintain strategic level cooperation.

Publicly, Europe does not accept China’s neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which it considers to be an important factor affecting China-EU relations. But from China’s perspective, this is mainly for the United States and the needs of the Sino-US game rather than for Europe. On the other hand, it is also a means of checking and balancing Europe: The reason why Europe will not fully support the United States is to prevent China from completely siding with Russia. Europe is also quite aware of this.

From a European perspective, although it has the best position in the three-party game, it has been hampered by various reasons, such as the United States’ control over it, its own loss of geopolitical thinking, value constraints, serious integration obstacles, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The current situation is the worst.

On the one hand, Europe needs to take advantage of the historical opportunity of the game between China and the United States to benefit from both sides, and at the same time, it needs to buy time to solve its internal problems and eventually form an independent pole. So it goes out of its way to avoid taking sides. But on the other hand, although it and the United States are allies, their relationship is not equal. NATO provides security and institutionalizes its subordination to the United States, making it difficult to escape U.S. control.

Europe currently faces several major challenges. Internally, there are integration difficulties, lack of economic competitiveness and the rise of populism. Externally, there are difficulties in strategic autonomy, climate change, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the rise of populism in the United States. Europe needs China for almost every problem, and China is stable and reliable. But the United States is different. If the Democratic Party is in power, some challenges can be supported by the United States. But if Trump or other populists are in power, the United States will become resistance on most issues.

Essentially, there is no geopolitical conflict between China and Europe, and Europe no longer pursues hegemony. Therefore, China’s development is not a threat to Europe, and both sides have common strategic interests. China-EU relations should develop well.

However, due to the fundamental changes in Sino-US relations, the epidemic in 2020, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the current Sino-European relations are really going backwards.

Europe is an ally of the United States and aligns with the United States in its most fundamental interests. In the strategic game between China and the United States, although Europe’s position is obviously different from that of the United States and it is not willing to choose sides between China and the United States, Europe still has to follow U.S. policies to a certain extent.

This is the case with the sanctions imposed on China in the name of so-called human rights and the Netherlands’ advanced photolithography machines no longer being exported to China. If an incident similar to Ukraine occurs between China and the United States in the future, Europe will have no choice but to side with the United States, and China and Europe will also become enemies by then. This expectation has also prompted Europe to continuously adjust its relations with China, proposing that China-EU relations are “cooperation, competition and rivals”, but it is increasingly tilted towards rivals.

The 2020 epidemic made Europe suddenly aware of the consequences of its industrial chain’s dependence on China. French President Macron had to personally call Chinese President Xi Jinping for help during the epidemic, and China made special arrangements for this. But France has paid huge diplomatic costs. At the same time, China has actively carried out assistance with masks, medical equipment, and vaccines, and has objectively rapidly expanded its global influence. This has shocked Europe, which believes that China is using the epidemic to expand geographically, which has also promoted the emergence of Europe’s de-risking strategy.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 has made it clear whether China-EU relations are friends or enemies that have long been unclear. China has not condemned or sanctioned Russia and maintained normal trade exchanges. On the one hand, this has replaced Europe’s economic presence in Russia. More importantly, Europe believes that this kind of trade has supported Russia’s wartime economy, offset the effectiveness of European and American sanctions, and has become the main reason why Russia can continue to fight.In the eyes of Europe, if China is not an enemy, it is definitely not a friend. In this case, the friendship and mutual trust between the two sides were damaged.

Trump’s election brings China and Europe closer

Structural factors in China-U.S.-Europe relations determine that no matter which political party in the United States wins, there will be no fundamental changes, only technical adjustments. If Harris, who supports values and allies, is elected, Europe will move closer to the United States. If Trump, who pursues unilateralism, is elected, Europe will move closer to China.

Specifically, Trump’s election will have four major positive impacts on China-EU relations. First, the opportunity has come for Europe to strengthen its strategic autonomy, and Europe will have more autonomy in its China policy.

On the one hand, because the United States, which is fighting alone, has relaxed or stopped putting pressure on its European allies to jointly deal with China, Europe can handle its relations with China more based on its own interests rather than those of the United States. On the other hand, it is also because the United States has abandoned Atlanticism and believes that Europe is a burden and a partner that takes advantage of the United States. Second, the United States has withdrawn from global issues such as climate change and public health, leaving only China and Europe to work together. Third, the United States will launch a trade war and tariff war against Europe and China at the same time. Although the intensity is different, the effect will be that China and Europe will face it together. Fourth, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will soon cease, and this will reduce one point of conflict between China and Europe.

However, from a global perspective, Trump’s re-election will have the greatest impact on the world structure, which will be its impact on the so-called liberal hegemonic order formed after World War II, which will further profoundly affect China-EU relations.

The main difference between the United States and its former European hegemons is that it relied on its own strength to establish a new order after the war: by establishing a complex system, it institutionalized the international order and restrained the power of the hegemon.

There are two main reasons why the United States does this, in addition to learning from historical lessons, values, and special geographical location. First, the United States relies on the advantages of its own system to consolidate its own power, and uses this to lock in other countries, so that the policies of these countries are in line with the interests of the United States, thereby continuing its power. The United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the WTO all play this role.

Second, since the United States also wants to abide by the system it has formulated, it has to restrict its own power and cannot do whatever it wants. This not only enhances the legitimacy of the order established by the United States, but also makes other weaker powers willing to cooperate and adapt. Because these countries can also use this system to have a certain degree of say and retain the possibility of reforming this system in the future. This reduces the cost of world domination for the United States.

Fundamentally speaking, the reason why the United States and other countries are willing to abide by this system and accept constraints is not because of morals and values, but because of interests.

But Trump believes that the United States is already the victim of this order: on the one hand, China has become the biggest beneficiary of this system and is developing rapidly. The United States views it as the biggest threat to its hegemony.On the other hand, other countries also benefit from this system for free, while the United States bears the costs. For example, the long-term military expenditure of most European allies is less than 2% of GDP, Germany and the United States have large trade surpluses, and even Taiwan, which accounts for 90% of the global high-end chip market, is used as evidence.

Therefore, although the United States and the West slander China as a revisionist due to geopolitical and ideological needs, it is trying to challenge and subvert the current international order. However, academic circles unanimously believe that the United States under Trump is a revisionist, and the world is witnessing a dramatic scene of a hegemonic country actively obstructing the international order it has established. This will inevitably lead to instability in the world, reduced public goods, and lower cooperation.

For China and Europe, both sides need to maintain the current system and face the consequences of the United States’ obstruction of the system. This is a higher strategic interest for both sides. This is also an important factor in why China and Europe will inevitably get closer during the Trump era.

But the extent to which China-EU relations will reach still depends on how much Trump will damage the current system in the next four years, especially whether he is a historical moment or represents a future trend. There are three main points that can be analyzed.

First, Europe will wait patiently for four years to see the evolution of the United States. If the Republican populists still win, Europe will make a strategic choice between China and the United States.
The second is the impact of Trump’s businessman character on his governance.

The characteristics of businessmen are nothing more than transactional, pragmatic, and putting interests first, with no interest in abstract things like values.

This is why there has not been any war in the world during his four years in office, which is different from the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East during the Biden period. For example, as soon as Biden took office, he declared his support for Ukraine to join NATO, stimulating Russia with great intensity. Trump would not do anything like this.

The third is the non-institutional operation of American politics.

Since the Republican Party not only won the president, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, but also won the majority of Republican-nominated justices on the Supreme Court, it was difficult for institutional checks and balances to work. Therefore, prominent non-institutional operations have become an important influencing factor.

Although the United States claims to be a country ruled by law, its political operations are very de-institutionalized. Take personnel appointments and removals as an example. The Secretary of State is the highest-ranking cabinet minister in the U.S. federal government. If the president is incompetent or dies, he will be the fourth successor.

It is an official of this level that Trump’s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was dismissed from his post with a single tweet during his overseas visit without any procedures.

His wife, Melania, who has no government position or power, also used Twitter to fire deputy national security adviser Mira Ricardel. But she did not know the official personally, simply because subordinates reported that she was not actively participating in one of the first lady’s charity activities.

The following events are related to international relations during the Trump era. First, Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou was arrested. U.S. National Security Advisor Bolton knew in advance. However, President Trump had no knowledge of such a major event affecting Sino-US relations. At that time, he was having dinner and talks with Chinese leaders in Argentina, and Bolton was sitting next to Trump. Five days later, Bolton publicly admitted on NPR that “things like this happen all the time, and the president is not informed every time.”

The second is that before and after the 2020 US election, on October 30 and January 8, Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, made two calls to the Chinese military without telling President Trump. He promised that the United States would not suddenly go to war with China or attack China. Even if it attacked, Milley would tell China in advance.

Third, former chief economic adviser Gary Cohn once saw a letter on the desk of the President’s office that he considered very dangerous. The letter would pull the United States out of a key trade agreement with South Korea, but could jeopardize top-secret U.S. national security programs that rapidly monitor North Korean missile launches. Cohen was afraid that Trump would sign the document, so he “stolen” the letter. Trump also didn’t notice the letter was missing.

The above is not a special case during the Trump era, but has happened frequently in American history. During the Fourth War in the Middle East, Brezhnev, the top leader of the Soviet Union, sent a letter to Nixon. The letter clarified the Soviet position and threatened that if the Soviet Union and the United States could not reach a consensus, the Soviet Union would join the war on the side of Egypt.

For such an important letter from the head of state, Kissinger, after consulting with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the White House Chief of Staff, actually decided not to inform the President and let them handle it. The reason was that Nixon was affected by the Watergate incident and was no longer capable of handling it.

The non-institutional operation of American politics has greatly limited Trump’s personal role. His influence or damage to the world is only to a certain extent. For example, he failed to improve relations with Russia during his term. Although he lacked diplomatic experience in facing China, it did not affect the bureaucracy’s strengthening of containment of China.

According to Trump’s first term, due to the autonomy of the internal bureaucracy and his businessman characteristics, his influence on the world is limited. But there is great uncertainty about the second term. Having learned from experience and already having a team of his own, he is likely to appoint only those who share his philosophy and follow his lead.

Generally speaking, Trump’s re-election is an opportunity for China-EU relations to improve and achieve new breakthroughs, but the degree of improvement and breakthroughs is quite uncertain, depending on Trump’s performance in his second term.

特朗普强势回归，以明显的优势胜选，打破此前各大民调的预测震惊世界。如果说2016年大选是偶然，这一次则毫无争议。事实上回过头来看，如果不是突发疫情，2020年特朗普仍会当选。三次选举结果表明，今天的美国确实根本性的改变了，它不再是一个世界所习惯的所谓自由主义霸权，而是一个民粹主义主导的国家。

美国是一个日趋衰落但仍然对世界有着巨大影响力的霸主。总统大选虽然是它的国内事务，但却有很大的外溢效应。这也包括中欧关系。

中美欧三方的结构性关系

目前中美欧三方在实力和利益基础上存在较为稳定的结构性关系。

在美国看来，中国的高速发展威胁到了它的霸主地位，所以把中国当作头号对手全力遏制。为此它不仅从大西洋——欧洲转向太平洋——亚洲，更需要欧洲盟友的全力配合，甚至需要欧洲牺牲它的利益。为此它既要打击欧洲的战略自主，也强求欧洲不能使用中国物美价廉的5G技术，不能向中国出售利润雄厚的芯片技术，最好全面和中国脱钩等，为中美博弈付出代价。

此外，美国还要想尽办法破坏中欧之间的战略性合作。2021年3月拜登就职之初，就利用价值观牌诱使欧洲联手对中国进行制裁，中国不得不反制裁，结果中欧双方长达七年才谈成的具有战略价值的投资协定就被冻结，中欧俱伤。

至少从结果来看，美国在实施遏制中国的战略目标的同时，也要削弱和控制具有潜在挑战其霸主地位能力的欧洲。

从中国角度讲，面对美国的打压，同样需要欧洲。既要避免欧洲完全倒向美国，还需要欧洲的市场和技术对中国开放。

此外，放眼全球，欧洲也是唯一一个能对美国产生重要影响的国家。比如2023年中美元首在旧金山会晤之后，中美关系趋于稳定。法国媒体就报道称是欧洲向拜登施加了巨大压力的结果。

但是中欧之间仍然存在矛盾和冲突。这除了价值观差异和美国的破坏性介入外，更主要的还是由于双方对对方的战略定位不同。在美国成为中国复兴最主要障碍之际，中国对欧外交服务于对美外交。而欧洲更多的是着眼于自身利益看待中国的，比如战略自主、气候变化等与自身利益密切相关的全球议题、俄乌冲突引发的安全问题以及避免成为中美博弈的受害者。

所以近期中欧围绕电动车的博弈和中欧在俄乌冲突立场上的差异，就是典型的体现。

电动车关税战有两个特点，一是欧洲所加关税远远低于美国。二是中国没有立即进行报复，而是在世贸组织进行诉讼，要通过国际法体系来解决，同时进行大量的外交谈判，试图改变欧盟的政策。这和中国对美国的关税战非常不同。

因为中国是从对美博弈角度来看待中欧之间的电动车关税的。中国即要积极捍卫自己的经济利益，也要以中美博弈的战略大局为重。欧洲对此非常清楚，知道中国不会为了电动车关税而放弃欧洲。这也是为什么中欧之间会发生贸易摩擦但又不会脱钩断链依然保持战略层面合作的原因。

欧洲公开场合是不接受中国对俄乌的中立立场，认为这是影响中欧关系的重要因素。但从中国的角度，这主要是面向美国，是中美博弈的需要而不是针对欧洲。另一方面也是对欧洲制衡的一种手段：欧洲之所以不会完全支持美国，是为了避免中国完全站到俄罗斯一边。欧洲对这一点也相当清楚。

从欧洲的角度看，虽然它在三方的博弈位置最好，但由于种种原因，比如美国对它的控制、自身丧失地缘政治思维、价值观束缚、严重的一体化障碍以及俄乌冲突等，导致它目前的处境最差。欧洲一方面需要借助中美博弈的历史机遇左右逢源、争取时间解决内部的问题，最终形成独立的一极，因此它竭力避免选边站。但另一方面，它和美国虽然是盟友，但双方关系并不平等。北约提供了安全，也把它对美国的从属地位制度化，很难摆脱美国的控制。

目前欧洲面临多个重大挑战。内有一体化困境、经济缺乏竞争力和民粹主义崛起，外有战略自主困难重重、气候变化、俄乌冲突以及美国民粹主义的崛起。 几乎每一个问题都需要中国，而且在这些议题上，中国稳定而可靠。反观美国，如果是民主党执政，部分挑战还可以得到美国支持，但特朗普或者其他民粹主义者执政，美国在多数问题上就变成阻力。

按说中欧从本质上讲没有地缘政治冲突，欧洲也已经不追求霸权，所以中国的发展对欧洲不是威胁，同时双方还有共同战略利益。中欧关系应该发展良好。但由于中美关系质变、2020年新冠疫情、2022年俄乌冲突，当下的中欧关系实是在倒退。

欧洲是美国的盟友，在最根本利益上和美国保持一致。中美战略博弈，欧洲虽然立场和美国有明显区别，也并不愿意在中美之间选边。但欧洲仍然不得不一定程度的追随美国的政策。以所谓人权为名对中国进行制裁、荷兰先进的光刻机不再对中国出口就是如此。假如未来中美发生类似于乌克兰事件，欧洲只能选择站在美国一边，届时中欧也同样会变成敌手。这种预期也促使欧洲不断调整对华关系，提出中欧“合作、竞争和对手”三分法，但日益向对手倾斜。

2020年的疫情，使得欧洲突然意识到产业链对中国的依赖所造成的后果。法国总统马克龙疫情期间不得不向中国国家主席习近平亲自打电话求援，中国也因此进行专项安排。但法国由此付出巨大的外交成本。同时中国积极开展口罩、医疗器材、疫苗援助，客观上迅速扩大了在全球的影响力，这让欧洲震撼，认为中国是借疫情进行地缘扩张，从而也推动了欧洲去风险战略的产生。

2022年的俄乌冲突，使得中欧关系长期以来模糊不清的究竟是朋友还是敌人清晰化了。中国没有谴责和制裁俄罗斯并保持正常的贸易往来。这一方面取代了欧洲在俄罗斯的经济存在，更重要的是欧洲认为这种贸易往来支撑了俄罗斯的战时经济，抵消了欧美制裁的成效，成为俄罗斯继续打下去的主要原因。在欧洲眼里，中国即使不是敌人但也绝不是朋友。在这种情况下，双方的友好和互信受到损害。

特朗普当选使中欧走近

中美欧关系的结构性因素决定了不管美国哪一个政党获胜，都不会产生根本性改变，只会有技术性调整。重视价值观和盟友的哈里斯当选，欧洲会向美国更加靠近。奉行单边主义的特朗普当选，欧洲会向中国靠近。

具体讲，特朗普当选会对中欧关系产生四大积极影响。一是欧洲强化战略自主的机会来临，欧洲对华政策有更多的自主权。一方面是由于单打独斗的美国放松或者不再对欧洲盟友施压以共同对付中国，欧洲可以更能根据自己的利益而不是美国的利益来处理对华关系。另一方面也是由于美国放弃大西洋主义，认为欧洲是包袱和占美国便宜的伙伴。二是美国从气候变化、公共卫生等全球议题退出，只剩下中欧两方携手合作。三是美国将同时对欧洲和中国进行贸易战、关税战，尽管力度不一，但效果却使得中欧双方共同面对。四是俄乌冲突会很快休战，中欧之间也由此减少了一个矛盾点。
不过从全球角度讲，特朗普再度当选对世界格局最大的影响还在于对二战后形成的所谓自由主义霸权秩序的冲击，并进而深刻地影响到中欧关系。

美国和昔日的欧洲霸主最大的不同在于，它在战后凭借自己的实力建立了一个新秩序。即通过建立一套复杂的体系实现了国际秩序制度化和对霸主国权力约束的机制。

美国之所以这样做，除了吸取历史教训、价值理念、特殊的地理位置外，主要有两个原因。一是美国凭借自己制定制度的优势巩固自身的权力，并以此锁定其他国家，让这些国家的政策符合美国利益的方向，从而将权力延续下去。联合国、世界银行、国际货币基金组织以及世贸组织都扮演着这样的功能。

二是美国既然也要遵守自己制订的这套制度，就不得不对自己的权力进行约束，而不能任意所为。这不但提升了美国所建立秩序的合法性，也使得其他实力较弱的大国愿意选择合作和顺应，因为这些国家也同样可以借助这套制度拥有一定程度的发言权，并在未来保留改革这一体系的可能性，这减少了美国统治世界的成本。

从根本上讲，美国以及各国之所以愿意遵守这套制度和接受约束，不是因为道德和价值观，而是利益使然。

但特朗普认为美国已经是这个秩序的受损者：一方面中国成为这个体系的最大受益者，发展迅速。在美国看来已是其霸主地位的最大威胁。另一方面其他国家也借这个制度搭便车，而由美国承担成本。欧洲盟友多数国家长期军费投入低于GDP的2%、德国和美国有大量贸易顺差，甚至台湾地区占据全球高端芯片90%的市场都被当作证据。

所以尽管美西方出于地缘政治和意识形态需要歪曲中国是修正主义者，试图挑战和颠覆现行国际秩序，但学界却一致认为特朗普治下的美国才是修正主义者，世界正在呈现一个霸权国家积极妨害自身建立的国际秩序的戏剧性场面。这必然导致世界局势不稳定、公共产品减少、合作降低。

对于中欧而言，双方都需要维持现行体系，更要面对美国妨害现行体系所带来的后果，这是双方更高的战略利益。这也是特朗普时期中欧必然走近的重要因素。

但是中欧关系究竟能达到什么程度还是取决于特朗普未来四年对现行体系破坏的程度有多大，特别是他究竟是历史一瞬还是代表着未来趋势。可资分析的主要有三点。

一是欧洲会耐心等四年，看美国的演变。如果仍然是共和党民粹主义者获胜，欧洲将会在中美做战略性选择。

二是特朗普的商人性格对执政的影响。商人的特点无非是交易性、务实性、利益置上，对价值观这种务虚的事情毫无兴趣。这也是为什么他任期四年内全球没有发生任何战争，这和拜登时期欧洲和中东都发生冲突皆然不同。像拜登一上任就声明支持乌克兰加入北约，高强度刺激俄罗斯。类似这样的事情特朗普是不会做的。

三是美国政治非制度性运作。由于共和党不仅赢得总统和参议院、众议院，最高法院共和党提名的大法官也是多数，制度制衡难以发挥作用。因此突出的非制度性运作就成了重要影响因素。

美国虽然号称法治国家，但政治运行的非制度化非常突出。以人事任免为例，国务卿是美国联邦政府中地位最高的内阁部长，如果总统不能胜任或者死亡将是第四位继承者。就是这样级别的官员，特朗普首任国务卿蒂勒森居然在出国访问期间被他用一个推特就解除职务，没有任何程序。他的夫人，没有任何政府职务和权力的梅拉尼亚也曾用推特解除国安副顾问瑞卡黛尔（Mira Ricardel）的职务，而她本人并不认识这位官员，仅仅因为下属反映此人对第一夫人的某项慈善活动未积极参加。

以下事件则与特朗普时期的国际关系有关。一是华为高管孟晚舟被捕。美国国家安全顾问博尔顿事先知晓，但如此影响中美关系的重大事件总统特朗普竟然毫不知情。当时他正和中国领导人在阿根廷举行晚餐和会谈，博尔顿就坐在特朗普身旁。5天之后博尔顿在NPR电台上公开承认“这样的事情经常发生，不是每一次都告知总统的”。

二是2020年美国大选前后，即2000年10月30日和2021年1月8日，美军参谋长联席会议主席、陆军上将马克-米利将军，瞒着特朗普总统给中国军方打了两通电话，保证美国不会突然与中国开战，或者攻击中国，就算攻击，米利也会提前告诉中方。

三是前首席经济顾问科恩（Gary Cohn）曾在总统办公室的书桌上看到一封他认为非常危险的信。这封信将使美国退出与韩国的一项重要贸易协定，但这可能会危害美国迅速监测朝鲜发射导弹的绝密国家安全项目。科恩害怕特朗普签署这份文件，便将信“偷走了”。特朗普也没有发现这封信函不见了。

以上并非特朗时期的特例，而是美国历史上常有之事。中东第四次战争期间，苏联最高领导人勃列日涅夫置信尼克松，阐明了苏联立场，并威胁苏美如果不能达成共识，苏联将站在埃及一边参战。这样重要的一封元首信函，基辛格在与国防部长、中央情报局局长和白宫办公厅主任协商后，竟然决定不告知总统，由他们自行处理，理由是尼克松受水门事件影响，状态不佳，已经没有能力处理了。
美国政治的非制度运作，使得特朗普个人的作用受到很大限制。他对世界的影响或者损害也只停留在某种程度上，比如他任内想改善和俄罗斯的关系也没有成功，他面对中国虽然外交经验缺乏，但并不影响官僚体系强化对中国的遏制。

从特朗普的第一个任期来看，由于内部官僚体系的自主性、他商人的特质都决定了其对世界的影响是有限度的。但第二个任期却有很大的不确定性。吸取经验教训而且已经有自己班底的他极有可能只任命既理念相同也唯他是从的人。

总的来看，特朗普再度当选是中欧关系改善和取得新突破的机遇，但改善和突破的程度却有相当的不确定性，这取决于特朗普第二任期的执政表现。