合力促进对非投资

自2003年以来，中国对非直接投资稳步增长。尽管在2019年流向非洲的对外直接投资减少到27亿美元，但总体来看，投资数额从2003年的7480万美元增长到2018年的54亿美元。而且，自2014年以来中国对非洲的直接投资流量已经超过了美国。中国在非洲的对外直接投资存量从2003年的4.9亿美元增长到2019年的444亿美元，增长了近100倍，年平均增长率为35%，并在2018年达到了461亿美元的新高。因此，中国已成为非洲最大的直接投资者。

面对新冠疫情的挑战，我们接下来应该怎么做？中国对非洲的直接投资至关重要。 

我们认为三个方面值得期待：

政府搭台 企业唱戏

首先，中国政府向中国投资者发出的信号尤其重要。"政府搭台，企业唱戏"，这句话的意义就在这里。在认识到所面临的新挑战的同时，中国在疫情后增加投资不仅可以向非洲市场注入资本，还可以振兴非洲大陆的经济。中国在这方面可以发挥巨大的作用。许多非洲国家基本被锁定在来自其他较富裕国家的私人投资之外，且许多非洲国家仍然没有信用评级——目前55个非洲国家中有32个国家拥有三个信用评级机构（标普、穆迪和惠誉）的一个或多个评级。然而，信用评级机构一贯使用几个经验变量——如人均GDP、GDP增长和通货膨胀，来决定信用评级中90%的变化。而这对非洲国家来说极具挑战性，特别是因新冠疫情等突发事件造成的经济衰退时。在疫情期间，四个非洲国家在加入暂停偿债倡议后立即被信用评级机构降级，从而刺激了更高的风险溢价。鉴于中国在这个体系之外，中国的投资者可以摆脱原有框架，真正做到需求导向的投资。中国政府可以向私营企业提供激励措施，以克服风险溢价，使其投资脱颖而出。中国在埃塞尔比亚的投资就是一个很好的例子——由于英国和美国的投资者担心资产被国有化，所以，将埃塞俄比亚视为高风险地区。而中国已经在埃塞俄比亚投资了很长时间，所以在其他相似的非洲国家，中国可以效仿之前在埃塞俄比亚的投资经验。中国政府向中国投资者发出的一个信号，即其他非洲国家也应被优先考虑，这将是至关重要的。

但如何才能真正实现这样的承诺？这让我们来到关于未来战略的第二点。

经贸合作区需进一步发展

2021年1月1日非洲大陆自由贸易区（AfCFTA）正式实行。在这样的背景下，优先利用经济特区在对非直接投资中的作用十分必要，甚至优先于拓展其他经济部门或领域的私营公共伙伴关系（PPP）。如果按国家数量计算，它是世界上最大的自由贸易协定。非洲大陆自由贸易区旨在为商品和服务以及商业和投资创造统一的市场。它在产业增值方面也很有意义，如果成功，将有助于提供成千上万个新的就业机会，这正是中国企业可以发挥作用的地方。据估计，在非洲有超过1万家中国企业，创造了几百万个就业机会。麦肯锡在2017年调查了8个非洲国家的1000多家中国公司，该调查数据显示，这些企业中89%的员工是非洲人，为非洲提供了30多万个就业岗位。 

在非洲建立经贸区，也指经济特区（SEZs）、自由贸易区、出口加工区、工业区和自由港，在2006年中非合作论坛北京峰会上首次在官方层面被提及，当时中国承诺“在未来三年内在非洲建立三到五个海外经贸合作区“。从那时起，每个中非合作论坛的行动计划都强调要不断建设、扩大或升级经贸区。目前，这些合作区是中国增加对非洲投资的关键机制之一，以支持中非双方的私营部门合作，并促进非洲的工业化和经济多样化发展。

目前，共有20个被商务部和财政部评估和确认的国家级经贸合作区，其中有四个在非洲，分别是：中国-埃及泰达苏伊士经贸合作区、中国埃塞俄比亚东方工业区、中国-尼日利亚经贸合作区（又称尼日利亚莱基自由区）和赞比亚-中国经贸合作区。官方数据表明，到2018年，中国已经在16个非洲国家投资建设了25个经贸合作区，总投资超过60亿美元。然而，通过与非洲政府和中国合作伙伴的讨论，我们认为中国投资的经贸合作区的实际数量超过25个。

大多数中国投资的经济特区本质上是基于企业自身的发展计划，但得到了中国政府的指导和/或中非发展基金的支持。这些经济特区也很符合 "双赢 "的合作模式——由中国政府支持的中国公司投资建设这些经济特区，并鼓励企业投资，可以促进当地的基础设施建设并提供就业机会。一旦这些经济特区建立起来，就有可能在非洲市场上占据主导地位，例如生产具有价格竞争力的消费品、建筑材料、机械和电子设备，而且产品也可以出口到其它市场。比如，如华坚集团等中国公司，已经将纺织品和服装生产转移到非洲，利用非洲与美国和欧洲市场的优惠贸易协定，而这正是非洲国家所希望的。 

不过，非洲的四个国家级经贸合作区也受到一些限制。

首先，到目前为止，这些经贸合作区主要由中国和少量其他外国企业主导。虽然这可以创造更多就业机会，但对技术转让，本土人才培养等方面有所限制，例如它对于培训高级管理人员并没有太大的意义，这是不可持续的。麦肯锡的报告显示，在接受调查的中资企业中，只有未超过半数的管理人员是非洲裔。同时，能与这些经贸区建立起很强联系的非洲企业也非常少。正如中国的发展经验表明，在战略行业建立合资企业（至少是在初期）是促进发展、价值链增加和国内创新的关键。第二，到目前为止，还没有中国投资者开始在非洲为中国市场生产产品，这仍然是一个巨大的缺口。

因此，鉴于经济特区在吸引投资和非洲自由贸易区方面的重要性，它们需要扩张，也需要更多的非洲公司参与到经济特区中来。中国和非洲的企业以及政府需要共同努力，通过与中非发展基金合作，支持、填补和扩大经济特区，以满足当地优势产业发展和对中国市场增长的期望。这也将有助于解决实际问题。

灵活多样的合作方式

第三，每个非洲国家都应该制定旨在吸引中国直接投资或经贸合作计划，积极主动地提出他们需要中国帮助的领域。我们经常看到非洲驻华大使和外交官参加会议和投资展览会。通常情况下，他们发表10到30分钟的演讲来宣传自己的国家，而这些介绍会被翻译成中文，这也不失为一个好机会。例如，2015年四个非洲国家（埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚、莫桑比克和赞比亚）启动了一个项目来促进中国对制造业的投资，总部设在日内瓦的联合国国际贸易中心（International
Trade
Center）、中非发展基金和英国国际发展部共同实施的“非洲投资与增长合作伙伴”（PIGA）项目，以四个非洲国家（埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚、莫桑比克和赞比亚）为试点，旨在促进中国对农产品加工和轻工制造业的投资。虽然像这样的活动和计划非常重要且实用，但还需要有更多的深度交流。例如，非洲的合作伙伴需要向中国投资者介绍其项目运营成本，并与中国的运营成本进行比较，而不仅是提及税收减免或其他投资奖励。从项目上看，通过项目交易平台（deal room）向英国投资者推广具体的投资项目，这些项目可以根据中国投资者的需求进行调整和定制。拥有经济特区的国家或非洲经济特区的经营者可以在外联方面寻求支持，以便更好地与中国和其他外国企业沟通，并就非洲企业如何更好地参与到经济特区中进行讨论。

中国在非洲的直接投资的重要性毋庸置疑。但在新冠疫情、非洲自由贸易区的成立以及因市场而愈加不公的 "非洲风险溢价 "的背景下，非洲和中国政府以及其他利益相关者有机会共同合作，扩大外国直接投资进入非洲，并推动其产生变革性影响。
2021年正是启动这一新计划的一年。

编辑 | 张梅

设计 | 大米

Chinese
FDI annual flows to Africa have increased steadily since 2003.1 From
2003 to 2018, flows rose from just US$74.8 million in 2003 to US$5.4
billion in 2018. Chinese FDI stocks in Africa have grown nearly 100-fold
from US$0.49 billion in 2003 to US$44.4 billion in 2019 with a 35%
average annual growth rate. The stocks peaked in 2018 at US$ 46.1
billion.2As a result, China has become the largest direct investor in
Africa, and on annual basis flows have exceeded those from the world’s
largest economy, the US, since 2014.3.4  
That said, there have been
some recent challenges. For instance, FDI flows to Africa in 2019
decreased to US$2.7 billion. And there is no doubt that the COVID19
pandemic has led to even lower FDI flows from China globally, including
to Africa.

A three-pronged strategy to raise Chinese FDI into Africa.

So
what next, especially given COVID-19’s challenges? Our view: Given the
next FOCAC meeting is scheduled to be held in Senegal this year, it is
necessary to formulate as soon as possible a more concrete action plan
between China and Africa on FDI.

We suggest this plan should have three components to be successful.

Reiterate the Chinese government’s commitment
First,
in China it is often said that “Government sets the stage, business
plays the drama” (政府搭台，企业唱戏). This saying is highly relevant here. More
investment is particularly meaningful in the post-COVID area to not only
inject capital into African markets but also to revitalize the
continent’s economy.  China can play a huge role in this regard. Many
African countries are essentially locked out of private investment from
other richer countries. Many African countries don’t have credit ratings
– now 32 out of the 55 African countries have one or more ratings from
the three credit rating agencies (S&P, Moddy’s, and Fitch).5
However, credit rating agencies consistently use several empirical
variables – such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, and inflation – to
determine 90% of the variations in credit ratings, which poses
challenges to African countries particularly when the economic downturn
caused by the sudden events such as COVID-19. During COVID-19, four
African countries were downgraded by credit rating agencies immediately
after joining the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, 6 thus stimulating
higher risk premiums. Since China is outside of this system, Chinese
investors can think outside of the box and be more demand-led. Chinese
government can even offer incentives to private companies to overcome
the risk premium, and this will mark its investments out. What has
already been done in Ethiopia is a good example – as Ethiopia is
typically seen as very risky from UK and US FDI point of view because of
concerns about nationalization of their assets. But China has invested
in Ethiopia for a long time and this can be done in other countries. A
signal from the Chinese government to Chinese investors that other
African countries should be prioritized as well will be crucial. 

But how can such a commitment really be achieved? This brings us to our second point about the strategy going forwards.

Use SEZs as an anchor for Chinese FDI – with more local involvement

In
the context of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – which
began implementation on 1st January 2021 – it is essential to leverage
the role of SEZs in FDI, as a priority, perhaps even before exploring
private public partnerships (PPPs) in other sectors or areas of the
economy. The AfCFTA is ambitious. It is the largest free trade agreement
in the world by number of countries. It aims to creating a single,
continent-wide market for goods and services, as well as business and
investment. It is also meaningful in terms of value addition, and if
successful will help to provide thousands of new employment
opportunities. This is where Chinese enterprises can help. According to a
report generated by McKinsey in 2017, which surveyed more than 1000
Chinese companies in eight African countries, 89 percent of employees
were African, adding up to more than 300,000 jobs for African workers.7
With the estimate of more than 10,000 Chinese firms in Africa, several
million African jobs had been created by China.8

Establishing
trade and economic zones in Africa, also referring to specific economic
zones (SEZs), free trade zones, export processing zones, industrial
zones and free ports, was firstly mentioned in the 2006 Beijing Summit
announced that China pledged “to establish three to five overseas
economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years”.
9 Since then, each action plan has somehow highlighted to continuously
construct, expand, or upgrade trade and economic zones. The zones now
are one of the key mechanisms used by China to increase investment in
Africa, support private sector cooperation between the two sides, and
boost industrialization and economic diversification in Africa. 

Officially,
there are four (out of 20) national-level economic and trade
cooperation zones in Africa confirmed and assessed by the Ministry of
Commerce and Ministry of Finance, those are, China – Egypt TEDA Suez
Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone, China Ethiopia Eastern Industry
Zone, China – Nigeria Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (also known
as Nigeria Lekki Free Zone), and Zambia – China Economic & Trade
Cooperation Zone.10 According to the government figure, by 2018, China
has invested in 25 economic and trade cooperation zones in 16 African
countries with a total investment of more than 6 billion US dollars.11
However, based on our own discussions with African governments and
Chinese stakeholders, we believe the actual number of Chinese-invested
zones to be larger than 25. 

The
majority of the Chinese-invested SEZs are, essentially, private
initiatives based on profit calculations but have received the guidance
from the Chinese government and/or support from CADFund. The zones also
fit well for “win-win” cooperation – Chinese companies supported by the
Chinese government invest in the construction of these zones and
encourage businesses to invest, which can build infrastructure and
provide job creation locally. Once these zones are well established,
they have the potential to take a dominant position in many African
markets for products such as competitively priced consumer goods,
building materials, machinery, and electronic equipment as well. Such
products can also be manufactured for export markets – indeed to date
there are several examples of Chinese firms who have moved textile and
apparel production to zones in Africa to take advantage of preferential
trade agreements with US and European markets. This is exactly what
African countries want.  However, the four national-level economic and
trade cooperation zones in Africa suffer two limitations. 

First,
they have so far been dominated by Chinese companies and foreign
companies. While this is good for overall job creation, it does not help
create senior management roles and technology transfer is limited –
which is unsustainable. The McKinsey report referred to earlier also
revealed that less than half senior managers at the Chinese-owned
companies surveyed were African.12 Few African enterprises are operating
inside the zones, yet as China’s own experience shows, requiring joint
ventures in strategic sectors – at least initially – is key for
development, value-chain addition as well as domestic innovation.
Second, no Chinese investor so far has begun manufacturing in Africa for
the Chinese market, which remains a huge gap.

Thus,
given SEZ’s importance in attracting investment and the AfCFTA, they
need to grow, and more African companies certainly need to be involved
in the zones. Chinese and African enterprises along with the governments
need to work together, perhaps with CADFund, to support filling and
expanding the SEZs in line with the local advantage industry and
expectations of China’s own market growth. This would also help address
real concerns, for instance as expressed in Nigeria, about unemployment
effects from cheap Chinese imports (in this case of textile and shoe
products). 13

Africans need to innovate as well

Third,
and last but not least, each African country should develop a bespoke
China FDI attraction or marketing plan, that proactively puts forwards
and packages what they need China to help with. From our vantage point
in China, we often see African Ambassadors and diplomats in China
participating in conferences and investment fairs. Typically, they will
provide presentations of anything from ten to thirty minutes to promote
their countries. These days, the presentations are often translated into
Chinese which helps. 

For
example, in 2015, Partnership for Investment and Growth in Africa
(PIGA) program, jointly implemented by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the Geneva-based International
Trade Center, the China-Africa Development Fund and the UK’s Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office, piloted four African countries
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia) to promote Chinese investment
in agro-processing and light manufacturing.14 However, while activities
and programs like these are very important and useful, more depth is
needed. For instance, African stakeholders need to be able to outline
their specific costs of operation to Chinese investors for specific
activities and compare them to Chinese operational costs, beyond just
mentioning tax breaks or other investment incentives. Program wise,
there are “deal rooms” that exist for promoting specific investment
projects to UK investors15. Such programs could be adapted and tailored
to Chinese investor needs. Countries with SEZs or African SEZ operators
could get support to reach out to Chinese partners to better connect
with Chinese and other foreign companies and negotiate how African
enterprises can better participate in these zones. 

There
is no doubt that Chinese FDI in Africa is and will remain important
going forwards. But in the context of COVID19, the AfCFTA and the
context of the unfair “Africa risk premium” which is being imposed by
other private sector markets, there is an opportunity for African and
Chinese governments and other stakeholders to work together to both
expand FDI itself into Africa, as well as make sure it has a
transformational impact. 2021 is the year to initiate this new plan. 

Editor | Zhang Mei

Design | Demi