On The Results of the Elections of Deputies of the European Parliament in 2024 and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the European Union2024年欧洲议会选举结果及其 对欧盟对外政策的影响

The party-political system of the European Union (EU) is experiencing a new stage of turbulence

On June 6-9, elections were held to the European Parliament (EP), which has fairly broad powers in the legislative field and in the field of foreign policy. In the five years since the previous pan-European elections in 2019, a number of important events have taken place in Europe, which have had a significant impact on the socio-political and socio-economic systems of the EU. This is the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a noticeable recession in the economy and forced the leadership of the EU and its member states to make serious efforts to restore it; and to overcome the consequences associated with climate change; and the growth of migration flows from Africa and Asia. All this has led to such contradictory transformations in the European party-political system as:

● the decline in popularity of the leading European parties: Conservatives, Social Democrats and Liberals;
● the rise to power of representatives of the right-wing forces in many EU member states;
● the ideological and political split within the EU between the old and new member states on the independence of the judiciary and respect for human rights, as well as sanctions policy against Russia and its supporting countries.

As a result, in recent years, in most European countries, an increasingly prominent role has been played by parties whose programs were a mixture of nationalist discourse with left-wing social demands, anti-elitism and anti-systemism.

The decline in the popularity of the leading parties led to an increase in the popularity of Eurosceptics, who were associated either with the radical European Identity and Democracy Party (ID) or with the more moderate “Party of European Conservatives and Reformists” (ECR). Moreover, representatives of the ECR in Italy (Brothers of Italy, BI) and the Czech Republic (Civic Democratic Party, CDP) currently head the governments of these countries, and in Poland the Law and Justice Party (PiS) was at the head of the government from 2015 until December 2023. At the same time, in some countries: Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, the Czech Republic and Sweden, there has been a tendency for the positions of center-right and far-right parties to converge, which may have noticeable consequences for the future of the European Union.

In 2022~2023, right-wing parties returned to power in a number of EU member states: Austria, Latvia, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden. This trend has affected the election results of the new EP, making it more conservative for the next five years. During this time, important laws should be adopted regulating trade and economic relations with China, further expansion of the EU, establishment of guarantees for compliance with the rule of law by member states, etc.

A serious problem for the EU has become the conflict between its ruling institutions and the leadership of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia over respect for the rights of citizens and the independence of the judicial branch of government. 

Election results and the new composition of the European Parliament

Following the results of the elections (as of June 14, 2024), the following European parties will be represented in the European Parliament, which will consist of 720 deputies:

● The center–right euro optimistic European People’s Party (EPP) – 190 deputies of the EP (DEP) (26.4%), 14 more than in 2019, when the previous elections were held;
● Center–left euro optimistic Party of European Socialists (PES) – 136 DEPS (18.9%), 3 less than in 2019;
● Euro optimistic European Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) – 80 DEPS (11.1%), 22 less than in 2019;
● Moderately eurosceptic Party of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) – 76 deps (10.6%), 7 more than in 2019;
● Radical eurosceptic Party Identity and Democracy (ID) – 58 deps (8.1%), 9 more than in 2019.;
● ecological euro optimistic European Green Party (EGP) – 52 DEP 7.2%, 19 less than in 2019;
● Left–wing, moderately Eurosceptic Party of the European Left (PEL) – 39 DEP (5.4%), 2 more than in 2019;
● New parties not affiliated with any one of the current European parties – 44 DEPS (6.05%), 44 more than in 2019;
● Independent deputies – 45 DEPS (6.25%), 12 less than in 2019.

These results confirmed the trend of transformation of the EU party and political system: the leading European parties EPP, PES and ALDE retained their leading positions in the EP, although the results of PES (- 3 DEP) and ALDE (-22 DEP) will decrease again compared to 2019, especially for liberals. The distribution of seats between these parties gives only a general idea of the trends in the political life of the European Union. The real balance of power in the new EP will depend on the ability of factions and individual parties to enter into coalitions with each other, which will undoubtedly require significant ideological flexibility and willingness to take political risks. While the EPP is likely to re-form a grand coalition with the Socialists and Liberals, it can also negotiate on certain issues with the right-wing parties in a working mode, if this does not create problems with traditional allies.

The EGP party, after impressive results in the 2019 elections, the European “greens” have lost ground almost everywhere. Opinion polls have shown that for European voters, the importance of the issue of climate change has significantly decreased compared to other issues such as security and living standards.

The EPP faction, as the largest, The nomination of its representative, Ursula von der Leyen (Germany), for a second term as President of the European Commission (EC) on 18 July was successful. The Portuguese Socialist Party (PSOE) is in second place and, if nothing else, its representative A. Costa, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, is likely to take the post of President of the European Council. The representative of ALDE, Estonian Prime Minister K. Kallas will receive the post of First Deputy Head of the European Commission, EU High Representative for Security and Foreign Policy. EPP representative will remain President of the European Parliament R.Metsola (Malta). To make all these decisions, a coalition of these three parties will be formed in the EP, which the EPZ can join.

As for the right-wing Eurosceptic parties advocating radical reform of the European Union: ECR and ID, they have significantly improved their results compared to 2019. But each of them had a relatively small faction in the EP, which did not allow them to have a real impact on the work of the European Parliament. In this regard, it is worth noting that on May 22, Marine Le Pen, the informal leader of the leading ID party of the “National Rally” (NR) of France, who confidently won the eurovision elections in her country, more than twice ahead of the party of President E. Macron’s “Renaissance”, said that NR refuses to cooperate with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party because of the Nazi statements of one of the leaders of the AFD. Two days later, the AfD was excluded from the IiD group, and soon after, M. Le Pen proposed to the leader of the ECR, Italian Prime Minister D. Meloni, to create a united group of right-wing eurosceptics in the new composition of the EP, which could take second place in the EP in terms of numbers, ahead of PES and ALDE. Meloni has not yet given her consent, but she has not given up on a possible alliance with the ID, where there would also be a place for 10 MEPs from Fidesz to Orban, who supported this initiative.

However, these far-right parties share ideological differences. They agree in assessing the problem of migration as the main non-military threat to the security of citizens, but they hold different positions on international policy issues, in particular, on the Ukrainian conflict, relations with Russia and other centers of power. This is clearly seen in the example of the disagreements between D. Meloni (ECR) and M. Le Pen (ID). If Meloni positions herself as an opponent of Russia’s increasing influence in Europe, a supporter of firm Atlanticism and support for Ukraine, then Le Pen holds a different opinion on these issues. At the same time, it must be admitted that the increased number of deputies from the extreme right will objectively put pressure on the policies of both the EU leadership and national governments.

The moderately Eurosceptic PEL party also improved its result, but remained the smallest in the EP and is unlikely to seriously influence the formation of the EP agenda.

Practice shows that the leading political institution of the EU, the European Council, which includes the heads of 27 member states, as well as its head, S. Michel (ALDE) and von der Leyen, as the head of the EC, plays a decisive role in the appointment of a new head of the EC. It is the European Council that proposes to the new composition of the EP a candidate for the post of head of the EC and, apparently, at its summit, which will take place shortly after the EU elections and where this issue will be discussed, von der Leyen will be re-approved by the head of the EC for the next 5 years.

The results of the last elections

Despite the fact that there have been no significant changes in the composition of the EP, the results of the last elections send an alarming signal to the leaders of the EU and its member states. They indicate that the problem of illegal migration occupies the first place in the perceptions of EU citizens about threats to their security. No matter how much European liberals say that an aging Europe needs migrant workers, illegal immigrants do not solve the issue of labor resources, but create additional problems. EU citizens are concerned about their own safety and the destruction of their usual socio-economic and cultural environment. These perceptions, in the absence of an effective solution to the migration problem, inevitably lead to the politicization and securitization of migration and asylum issues, as well as the marginalization of other EU security challenges.

Another serious reason for the strengthening of right–wing sentiments in the EU, even in countries where left-wing parties have historically been strong, has been the deepening gap between supranational and national elites, on the one hand, and ordinary citizens, on the other. EU citizens often perceive integration as an elite project of Brussels technocrats who ignore the needs of ordinary people. According to surveys, less than half of EU citizens are satisfied with how democracy works in their countries.

The role of the EP is to review and approve new legislation, conduct policy debates and allocate financial resources. This means that the composition of the new EP will determine the prospects for the legislative process on many vital issues for the future of the European Union – the migration problem, the green agenda, further expansion of the EU, strategic autonomy and interaction with the world’s leading centers of power: the United States, China, Russia, India, etc. The main question is: how will the increased representation of far-right MPs in the new EP affect the EU agenda and legislation over the next five years and European politics more broadly?

The completed terms in the European Parliament, as recognized by European politicians, was the most progressive of all EU institutions. On issues related to the rule of law, he insisted on strengthening accountability in countries where democratic norms were violated, especially the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the media. The main supporters of these initiatives were the center-left and liberal parties. A shift to the right may lead to the fact that the topic of the rule of law in the EU will receive less support in the new EP, despite the fact that the EPP proclaims this as one of the main criteria for cooperation with far-right parties. Most likely, the European Green Agenda will also be revised, as the elections showed a drop in voter interest in the climate problem.
The EP has limited powers in the field of foreign policy and security and defense policy, which mostly remain the prerogative of national Governments. Therefore, changes in its composition are unlikely to have an immediate impact on the EU’s support for Ukraine. However, the reduction of American aid to Kiev in the event of D. Trump’s victory may cause a similar impulse among right-wing EP deputies under the pretext of reorienting funds to support EU citizens and businesses. It is obvious that the right-wing parties, with the possible support of the centrists, will take a tougher position on EU enlargement, primarily the economic integration of potential members.

The rightward tilt in the EU member states undoubtedly introduces some uncertainty about the further development of European integration. However, the answer to the question “will there be more or less Europe after the EU elections?” depends not so much on the right-wing parties as on whether the traditional European consensus of populists, socialists and liberals will remain. 

欧盟的政党政治体制正经历着新的动荡阶段

6月6日至9日，在立法和外交政策领域拥有相当广泛权力的欧洲议会（EP）举行了选举。自 2019 年上届全欧选举以来的五年间，欧洲发生了一系列重大事件，对欧盟的社会政治和社会经济体系产生了重大影响。这些事件包括：新冠疫情大流行导致经济明显下滑，迫使欧盟及其成员国的领导层认真努力重建经济；应对气候变化的影响；来自非洲和亚洲的移民潮不断增加。所有这一切导致欧洲政党政治体系发生了以下矛盾的转变：

● 欧洲主要政党：保守党、社会民主党和自由党的声望下降；
● 右翼势力在许多欧盟成员国崛起；
● 欧盟内部新老成员国在司法独立、尊重人权以及对俄罗斯及其支持国的制裁政策等问题上存在意识形态和政治分歧。

因此，近年来，在大多数欧洲国家，以民族主义言论与左派社会诉求、反精英主义和反体制主义相结合为纲领的政党日益突出。

由于主要政党的声望下降，欧洲怀疑论者的声望上升，他们要么与激进的认同民主党（ID）有关，要么与较为温和的欧洲保守与改革党（PECR）有关。此外，欧洲保守与改革党在意大利（“意大利兄弟党”，BI）和捷克共和国（“公民民主党”，CDP）的代表目前正领导着这些国家的政府，而在波兰，法律与公正党（ZiS）从 2015 年到 2023 年12月一直领导着政府。与此同时，在一些国家：奥地利、比利时、捷克共和国、芬兰、意大利、荷兰和瑞典，中右翼政党和极右翼政党之间出现了趋同趋势，这可能会对欧盟的未来产生显著影响。

2022～2023 年，右翼政党在一些欧盟成员国重新执政：奥地利、拉脱维亚、西班牙、荷兰、波兰、葡萄牙、芬兰、瑞典。这一趋势影响了新一届欧洲议会的选举结果，使其在未来五年更加保守。在此期间，应通过重要法律来规范与中国的经贸关系、进一步扩大欧盟、建立成员国的法治保障等。

欧盟执政机构与匈牙利、波兰和斯洛伐克领导层在尊重公民权利和司法独立问题上的冲突已成为欧盟面临的一个严重问题。

选举结果与欧盟议会的新构成

根据选举结果（2024年6月14日），欧洲议会将由720 名议员组成，以下欧洲政党将成为欧洲议会的代表：

● 中右翼拥欧洲政党欧洲人民党（EPP）——获得190个席位（占 26.4%），比 2019 年上届选举多14名；
● 中左翼拥欧洲政党欧洲社会党（PES）——获得136个席位（18.9%），比 2019 年减少 3名；
● 对欧洲持乐观态度的欧洲党派欧洲自由与民主联盟（ALDE）——得到80个席位（11.1%），比 2019 年减少 22 个；
● 中度疑欧党派欧洲保守派和改革派（ECR）——占有76个席位（10.6%），比 2019 年多7个；
● 激进的疑欧派政党身份与民主党（I&D）——得到58个席位（8.1%），比 2019 年多 9个；
● 环保主义的拥欧政党欧洲绿党（EiP）——拥有52 席位（7.2%），比 2019 年减少 19个；
● 左翼激进、温和疑欧的欧洲左翼党（PEL）——得到39个议席（5.4%），比2019年增加 2个；
● 不隶属于任何现有欧洲党派的新党派——占有44个议席（6.05%），比 2019 年增加44个；
● 独立议员——获得45个议席（6.25%），比 2019 年减少12名。

这种结果证实了欧盟政党政治体系的转变趋势：欧洲主要政党欧洲人民党、欧洲社会党和欧洲联合民主联盟在欧洲议会中保持领先地位，尽管欧洲社会党和欧洲联合民主联盟的结果与 2019 年相比将再次下降，尤其是自由党。这些党派之间的席位分配只能大致反映欧盟政治生活的趋势。新一届欧洲议会的实际权力平衡将取决于各派别和各政党相互联合的能力，这无疑需要相当大的意识形态灵活性和承担政治风险的意愿。尽管欧洲进步党很可能再次与社会党和自由党结成大联盟，但只要不与传统盟友产生问题，它也可以在某些问题上与右翼政党达成工作模式上的一致。

欧洲绿党在 2019 年大选中取得令人印象深刻的成绩后，这次几乎在所有地方都失去了优势。民意调查显示，与安全和生活水平等其他问题相比，对欧洲选民来说，气候变化的重要性已明显下降。
欧洲人民党作为最大的派别，于7月18日提名其代表乌苏拉-冯德莱恩（德国）连任欧盟委员会（EC）主席获得成功。葡萄牙社会党排名第二，如果不出意外的话，其代表、葡萄牙前总理科斯塔（A. Costa）很可能担任欧洲理事会主席一职。欧洲自由与民主联盟的代表、爱沙尼亚总理卡拉斯将担任欧盟委员会第一副主席兼欧盟安全与外交政策高级代表一职。欧洲进步党代表梅措拉（马耳他）继续担任欧洲议会议长。为了在欧洲议会做出所有这些决定，这三个党派将组成一个联盟，欧洲共同体也可能加入该联盟。

至于支持对欧盟进行激进改革的右翼疑欧党派：欧洲反对种族主义和不容忍委员会（ECR）和欧洲反对种族主义和不容忍联盟（I&D），与 2019 年相比，它们的成果显著提高。但它们在欧洲议会中的派别都相对较小，无法对欧洲议会的工作产生真正的影响。在这方面，值得注意的是，5月22日，法国主要 I&D 党派——国民联盟（RN）的非正式领导人玛丽娜·勒庞宣布，国民联盟拒绝与德国选择党合作，原因是德国选择党的一位领导人发表了纳粹言论。两天后，德国另类选择党被开除出 I&D 党团，不久后勒庞向德国另类选择党的领导人提出了一项建议。勒庞向 ECR 领导人、意大利总理梅洛尼提议，在新的欧洲议会中建立一个右翼疑欧论者的联合团体，该团体可以在欧洲议会中占据第二位，排在 PES 和 欧洲自由与民主联盟之前。梅洛尼尚未表示同意，但她并没有放弃与 I&D 结盟的可能性，因为在 I&D 中还将容纳 10名支持这一倡议的匈牙利公民联盟领导人欧尔班的欧洲议会议员。

然而，这些极右翼政党在意识形态上存在分歧。他们一致认为移民是对公民安全的主要非军事威胁，但在国际政策问题上，特别是在乌克兰冲突、与俄罗斯和其他权力中心的关系上，他们的立场却不尽相同。梅洛尼和勒庞之间的分歧就很好地说明了这一点。梅洛尼将自己定位为反对俄罗斯在欧洲扩大影响力、支持坚定的大西洋主义和支持乌克兰的人，而勒庞则在这些问题上持不同意见。同时，我们不能不承认，极右翼议员人数的增加将在客观上对欧盟领导层和各国政府的政策施加压力。

对欧洲持温和怀疑态度的人民自由党也取得了进步，但仍是欧洲议会中人数最少的政党，不太可能对欧洲议会议程的形成产生重大影响。

实践证明，欧盟的主要政治机构——欧洲理事会——在任命新的欧委会负责人方面起着决定性的作用，欧洲理事会包括 27 个成员国的首脑，以及其负责人米歇尔（S. Michel）（ALDE）和欧委会负责人冯德莱恩。欧洲理事会向新一届欧洲议会提出欧委会主席候选人，显然，在欧洲选举结果公布后不久举行的欧洲理事会峰会上，冯德莱恩再次被批准担任未来 5 年的欧委会主席。

选举结果分析

尽管欧洲议会的组成没有发生重大变化，但过去几次选举的结果向欧盟及其成员国的领导人发出了一个令人震惊的信号。选举结果表明，非法移民在欧盟公民的安全威胁观念中占据首位。无论欧洲自由派人士如何说老龄化的欧洲需要劳动力移民，非法移民不仅没有解决劳动力资源问题，反而制造了更多的问题。欧盟公民担心自己的安全，担心自己熟悉的社会经济和文化环境遭到破坏。在移民问题得不到有效解决的情况下，这些看法不可避免地导致了移民和庇护问题的政治化和安全化，以及欧盟其他安全挑战的边缘化。

欧盟右翼情绪高涨的另一个严重原因是，超国家和国家精英与普通公民之间的鸿沟日益加深，即使在历史上左翼政党力量强大的国家也是如此。欧盟公民往往认为一体化是布鲁塞尔技术官僚的精英项目，忽视了普通民众的需求。根据民意调查，只有不到一半的欧盟公民对本国的民主运作方式感到满意。

欧洲议会的职责是审查和批准新立法、开展政治辩论和分配财政资源。这意味着新一届欧洲议会的组成将决定欧盟未来许多重要问题的立法进程前景——移民问题、绿色议程、欧盟的进一步扩大、战略自主权以及与世界主要权力中心（美国、中国、俄罗斯、印度等）的互动。主要问题是：极右翼议员在新一届欧洲议会中的代表性增加，将如何影响欧盟未来五年的议程和立法，以及更广泛的欧洲政治？

业已结束任期的议会被欧洲政界人士公认为欧盟所有机构中最进步的。在与法治有关的问题上，它推动对违反民主准则的国家强化问责，特别是司法独立和媒体自由。这些举措的主要支持者是中左翼和自由派政党。尽管欧洲人民党宣称欧盟法治是与极右翼政党合作的主要标准之一，但向右转可能会导致新一届欧洲议会减少对欧盟法治的支持。欧洲绿色议程也有可能被重新考虑，因为选举显示选民对气候问题的兴趣有所下降。

欧洲议会在外交、安全和防务政策领域的权力有限，这在很大程度上仍是各国政府的特权。因此，其组成的变化不太可能对欧盟对乌克兰的支持产生直接影响。然而，如果特朗普获胜，美国将减少对基辅的援助，这可能会在右翼欧洲议会议员中引发类似的冲动，其借口是调整资金方向以支持欧盟公民和企业。很明显，右翼政党在中间派的可能支持下，将对欧盟扩大采取更强硬的立场，首先是潜在成员国的经济一体化。

欧盟成员国的右翼倾向无疑会给欧洲一体化的进一步发展带来一些不确定性。然而，“欧盟大选后的欧洲是多了还是少了？”这个问题的答案与其说取决于右翼政党，不如说取决于由民粹主义者、社会主义者和自由主义者组成的传统欧洲共识能否得到保留。